


**IN DISCIPLINARY DISTRICT V
OF THE
BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE**



**IN RE: KEVIN WILLIAM TEETS, JR.
BPR No. 029981, Respondent,
an Attorney Licensed to Practice
Law in Tennessee
(Davidson County)**

DOCKET NO. 2021-3217-5-JM

JUDGMENT OF THE HEARING PANEL

This matter came for trial before this Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility ("Board") of the Supreme Court of Tennessee on June 27, 2023, at the Nashville School of Law, 4013 Armory Oaks Drive, Nashville, Tennessee. The Hearing Panel consisting of Christopher Sabis (Chair), Steven Parman, and Luther Wright, Jr., after considering the entire file in this case, the testimony and exhibits offered at the hearing, and arguments of the parties, the parties' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and after thorough deliberations, makes the below Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and renders Judgment as follows.

BACKGROUND

Respondent Kevin William Teets, Jr. ("Mr. Teets" or "Respondent") is licensed to practice law in the State of Tennessee, though his license is not currently active. Mr. Teets' license was suspended for one year by Order of the Tennessee Supreme Court on October 13, 2021, and has not been reinstated.¹ This case is based upon a Petition for Discipline filed on December 29, 2021,

¹ On June 26, 2023, the day before trial in this matter, Mr. Teets submitted a Petition of Reinstatement to the Board via email relating to his October 13, 2021 suspension, which was entered into the record in this matter as Exhibit 48. The Board informed Mr. Teets that, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, § 30.4(d), he needed to take additional steps to petition for

a Supplemental Petition for Discipline filed on April 26, 2022, and a Second Supplemental Petition for Discipline filed on December 15, 2022. The Petition for Discipline includes three complaints (James Thayer, Ciciley Hoffman, and Michael D. Herrin, Esq.). The Supplemental Petition for Discipline contains four complaints (Christopher Starnes, Greg Grant, Caitlin Hayes, and Margaret Sagi, Esq.). The Second Supplemental Petition for Discipline contains two complaints (Matthew Billingsley and John Schweri, Esq.), making a total of nine complaints pending against Mr. Teets.

On March 8, 2023, the parties filed an Agreed Stipulation of Facts containing approximately seven pages of stipulated facts. The June 27, 2023 hearing in this matter lasted approximately one day, during which the Board called multiple witnesses, who were subject to cross-examination by Mr. Teets.² Mr. Teets offered evidence through his own cross and direct examinations. Based upon the full record, the Hearing Panel makes the following Findings of Fact.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Mr. Teets has been licensed to practice law in Tennessee since 2011.
2. Mr. Teets has a prior history of discipline, including
 - a. March 3, 2017 – Order of Temporary Suspension for Misappropriation of Funds (Exhibit 43);
 - b. August 10, 2020 – Order of Suspension for thirty days subject to conditions of contacting the Tennessee Lawyer Assistance Program (“TLAP”) for an evaluation, and one year under a practice monitor (Exhibit 44); and

reinstatement, including payment of an advance cost deposit to cover the anticipated costs of the reinstatement proceeding. Respondent took no further action and the Board closed the matter. No subsequent petition has been filed as of the date of this Judgement.

² One witness, Mr. Meeks, appeared at the hearing but left before it concluded and was not called as a witness by either party.

- c. October 13, 2021 – One year Suspension for lack of candor toward a tribunal (Exhibit 45).

3. The Respondent has managed political campaigns for various politicians in the State of Tennessee and was the Executive Director of the Democratic Party during periods when not actively practicing law.

File No. 68012c-5-ES – James Thayer

Stipulated Facts

4. James Thayer retained Mr. Teets on or about May 3, 2021, to represent him on a claim for damage to his personal property, stored in a rented storage unit, resulting from a roof leak at the storage building.

5. Mr. Thayer paid Mr. Teets a \$1,500.00 retainer for the new representation, of which \$250.00 was an unearned credit remaining from a previous fee that Mr. Thayer had paid Mr. Teets. The new portion of the retainer was paid using a VISA credit card.

6. Mr. Teets agreed to write a demand letter to the insurance company for the storage facility which had coverage on the building no later than June 15, 2021, and to file a lawsuit for damages to Mr. Thayer's property if the demand was not met.

7. On July 3, 2021, Mr. Thayer sent Mr. Teets a message requesting a refund of the attorney's fee he had paid to Mr. Teets because Mr. Teets had not written the promised demand letter or filed a civil suit for damages to Mr. Thayer's property.

8. When Mr. Teets had not responded to Mr. Thayer's message by July 8, 2021, Mr. Thayer filed a formal complaint against Mr. Teets with the Board.

9. The Board sent Mr. Teets a letter dated September 10, 2021, informing him of Mr. Thayer's complaint and requesting a response from Mr. Teets within ten days. Mr. Teets did not

respond to the Board's letter, and has not refunded any attorney's fees paid by Mr. Thayer.

File No. 68755c-5-ES – Ciciley Hoffman

Stipulated Facts

10. On July 15, 2021, Ciciley Hoffman retained Mr. Teets and paid him a \$700.00 retainer to represent her on a public intoxication case in Robertson County General Sessions Court.

11. On October 5, 2021, Ms. Hoffman filed a Board complaint against Mr. Teets. The Board sent Mr. Teets a letter dated October 21, 2021, notifying him of Ms. Hoffman's complaint and requesting his response.

12. Mr. Teets did not respond to the Board's letter of October 21, 2021, or a subsequent letter from the Board regarding Ms. Hoffman's complaint.

Additional Facts Established at Hearing

13. On her court date of September 21, 2021, Ms. Hoffman discovered that Respondent had not entered an appearance in her case. Mr. Teets then failed to appear for the hearing despite giving her assurances that he was "on the way."

14. When Respondent did not appear, the General Sessions Judge asked Ms. Hoffman if she wanted to plead guilty and she decided to do so because she was alone and without representation. Ms. Hoffman entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to pay a \$25.00 fine plus court costs.

15. Ms. Hoffman requested that Respondent refund her \$700.00, but he never reimbursed her for any portion of the fee.

File No. 67921c-5-ES – Michael Douglas Herrin, Esq.

Stipulated Facts

16. In June 2021, Michael D. Herrin, an attorney in Oxford, Mississippi, notified the

Board of an alleged ethical violation committed by Mr. Teets in the pending case of *Amer Alshehabi vs. Marcy Hillis and Brad Elam*, Rutherford County Circuit Court Case No. 78249.

17. By letters dated June 25, 2021, and September 7, 2021, and by an e-mail sent on the latter date, the Board notified Mr. Teets of the complaint filed against him by Mr. Herrin and requested his response.

18. Mr. Teets did not respond to either letter or the e-mail regarding Mr. Herrin's complaint.

Additional Facts Established at Hearing

19. Respondent did not complete the representation at issue in the *Elam* matter and did not inform Mr. Elam when his license was suspended on October 13, 2021.

20. Respondent filed pleadings in the *Elam* case wherein he listed his bar registration number as "092220" when his correct bar registration number is "029981" (Exhibits 37, 38, 39).

21. Respondent was ordered to pay \$3,000.00 in attorney's fees in the *Elam* case, but failed to do so.

File No. 69041-5-ES – Margaret Frances Sagi, Esq.

Stipulated Facts

22. In September 2021, Mr. Teets commenced his representation of Alvin Jensen, a criminal defendant charged in Cheatham County Circuit Case No. 18139A.

23. The Tennessee Supreme Court suspended Mr. Teets' law license on October 13, 2021. The order of suspension was effective upon entry.

24. In an e-mail sent on November 5, 2021, Mr. Teets informed Assistant District Attorney General Margaret F. Sagi and David Wyatt, her co-counsel for the State, that he had been suspended from the practice of law. Mr. Teets attached a motion for discovery to his e-mail and

informed Ms. Sagi and Mr. Wyatt that he wanted to obtain discovery for his client and had registered with ProDocs, the web-based cloud storage service used by the Cheatham County District Attorney's office to provide e-discovery to criminal defense attorneys.

25. On November 8, 2021, the Board received a complaint against Mr. Teets filed by Ms. Sagi.

26. On November 9, 2021, the Board sent a letter to Mr. Teets and forwarded the complaint filed by Ms. Sagi against him and requested his response. Mr. Teets did not respond to the letter.

Additional Facts Established at Hearing

27. In early November 2021, Respondent filed a Request for Discovery and Inspection with the Circuit Court Clerk in the *Jensen* case.

28. More than 20 days had passed from his October 13, 2021 suspension to Mr. Teets' request for access to the District Attorney's ProDocs software program to obtain the discovery materials in the *Jensen* case.

29. Respondent did not file a Motion to Withdraw as counsel in the case.

File No. 69549 – 5-ES – Christopher Tyrone Starnes

Stipulated Facts

30. On March 6, 2021, Christopher Starnes retained Mr. Teets to represent him on a Sex Offender Registry charge and a probation violation for a flat fee of \$2,000.00.

31. Mr. Starnes's fiancée, Nicole Rankin, paid the \$2,000.00 fee in three installments.

32. Mr. Teets told Mr. Starnes that he would appear for Mr. Starnes' court date on May 7, 2021, but Mr. Teets failed to do so.

33. Mr. Starnes filed a complaint against Mr. Teets with the Board on January 10, 2022,

and the Board sent Mr. Teets a letter dated January 13, 2022, forwarding the complaint and requesting a response.

34. Mr. Teets did not respond to the Board's letter of January 13, 2022.

Additional Facts Established at Hearing

35. Ms. Rankin and Mr. Starnes heard from Respondent briefly after they retained him, but then were unable to contact him. Mr. Teets did not communicate any reason for his absence from Mr. Starnes' May 7, 2021 hearing.

36. When Ms. Rankin and Mr. Starnes could not get Mr. Teets to respond to their calls and messages, Mr. Starnes was forced to hire another attorney, Tommy Overton, to take over the case.

37. Respondent never refunded any of the \$2,000.00 fee that Ms. Rankin had paid him to represent Mr. Starnes, despite her requests for one

File No. 69439-5-ES – Gregory Grant

Stipulated Facts

38. Gregory Grant hired Mr. Teets on April 28, 2021, to represent him in the appeal of a civil judgment entered against him in the case of *Shelby County Democratic Party, et al. vs. Greg Grant, et al.*, CH-19-1370-III, on appeal, W2021-00256-COA-R3-CV.

39. Mr. Grant paid Mr. Teets a non-refundable retainer of \$2,500.00 and later an additional \$2,000.00 in fees.

40. On May 19, 2021, Mr. Teets filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Mr. Grant in the Court of Appeals.

41. On May 21, 2021, Mr. Teets filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file the transcript, and the Court of Appeals entered an Order granting an extension through June 10, 2021.

42. Mr. Grant filed a Board complaint against Mr. Teets on December 20, 2021, and the Board forwarded the complaint to Mr. Teets on January 13, 2022, with a letter requesting his response to the complaint within ten days.

43. Mr. Teets did not respond to the Board's letter regarding this complaint.

Additional Facts Established at Hearing

44. Mr. Grant came to Nashville in April 2021, and asked the Respondent if he could stop by Respondent's office; however, Respondent directed Mr. Grant to meet him late one afternoon at a Nashville hotel where Mr. Grant paid the initial retainer. Mr. Grant thought it strange that Respondent would not agree to meet him at Respondent's office.

45. Despite no record on appeal being filed, Respondent filed a "Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief," which the Court of Appeals denied as premature on August 20, 2021 (Exhibits 30 & 31).

46. Respondent never notified Mr. Grant or the Court of Appeals when his license was suspended in October 2021, nor did he take any steps to withdraw from the case. In January 2022, the Court of Appeals ordered Mr. Grant to show cause within 15 days why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of an appealable judgment (Exhibit 32).

47. On April 3, 2023, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, noting that more than one year had passed and that Mr. Grant had not filed a response "or any other pleading" in the case (Exhibit 33).

48. Mr. Grant paid Respondent a total of \$4,500.00 in attorney's fees in the case. Respondent has never refunded any of Mr. Grant's attorney's fees despite Mr. Grant asking for a refund.

File No. 68983-5-ES – Caitlin Hayes³

Stipulated Facts

49. In September 2020, Caitlin Savage retained Mr. Teets to represent her in a divorce action and paid Mr. Teets \$2,000.00 in attorney's fees.

50. Mr. Teets filed a divorce complaint on behalf of Ms. Savage in the Putnam County Circuit Court on September 16, 2020. Ms. Savage notified Mr. Teets that she was attempting to reconcile with her husband, but she later informed him that the couple had failed to reconcile and asked him to proceed with the divorce in June 2021.

51. On August 30, 2021, Mr. Teets received a draft of a marital dissolution agreement from opposing counsel and forwarded it to Ms. Savage by e-mail. The next day, Ms. Savage sent Mr. Teets an e-mail forwarding her the completed marital dissolution agreement with her notarized signature. In the e-mail, Ms. Savage pointed out an error in the document and requested further instructions on whether she needed to do anything to help correct the error, or mail a printed copy to the court clerk.

52. Mr. Teets arranged for a hearing date of October 1, 2021, to finalize the divorce, and Ms. Savage requested that Mr. Teets provide her with a Zoom link to participate. On the date of the scheduled hearing, Mr. Teets notified her that there would be no hearing that day.

53. Ms. Savage filed a Board complaint against Mr. Teets on October 28, 2021, and the Board notified Mr. Teets of the complaint and requested his response within ten days by letter dated November 30, 2021. Mr. Teets did not reply to the Board's letter.

Additional Facts Established at Hearing

54. Respondent would not communicate with counsel for Ms. Hayes' husband about

³ Ms. Hayes was originally referred to in the Petition as Caitlin Savage.

resolving issues relating to their marital dissolution agreement. Her husband sent her messages advising that Respondent would not respond to his attorney's communications.

55. Ms. Hayes ultimately appeared in court alone to obtain her divorce, without representation, because Respondent had abandoned her as a client.

56. Mr. Teets did not file a motion to withdraw or advise her that his law license had been suspended on October 13, 2021.

57. Ms. Hayes filed a complaint with the Board against Respondent and sought a refund of her attorney's fee.

File No. 69935-5-ES – John M. Schweri, Esq.

Stipulated Facts

58. On October 1, 2021, John Schweri retained Mr. Teets to represent him for an eviction on a rental property in Davidson County and paid Mr. Teets a \$1,500.00 attorney's fee to appear in General Sessions Court on October 8, 2021, and handle the case to conclusion.

59. On October 7, 2021, Mr. Teets informed Mr. Schweri via text message that Mr. Teets was ill and would be unable to appear in court on October 8th. Mr. Schweri responded to Mr. Teets by telling him that he would appear in court himself. Mr. Schweri represented himself in court and resolved the case.

60. Mr. Schweri informed Mr. Teets on October 8th that he expected Mr. Teets to refund his attorney's fee. On October 26, 2021, Mr. Teets texted Mr. Schweri that he would have the refund to him by the end of the week.

61. On November 4, 2021, Mr. Teets again texted Mr. Schweri promising to refund the fee "by Monday at the latest." Mr. Teets has never sent Mr. Schweri any refund for the attorney's fee, despite doing no work on his case.

62. Mr. Schweri filed a complaint against Mr. Teets with the Board on May 11, 2022, which the Board forwarded to Mr. Teets with a letter dated May 18, 2022, requesting his response to the complaint within ten days. Mr. Teets did not respond to the Board's letter.

File No. 70850-5-ES – Matthew Billingsley

Stipulated Facts

63. Matthew Billingsley retained Mr. Teets on May 20, 2021, to file suit on behalf of Mr. Billingsley and his business, Evolve Weight and Age Management LLC, d/b/a Jack and Jill Aesthetics, against a former employee and her husband, Brian and Susan Cody, seeking injunctive relief to enforce a non-competition clause in an employment agreement and for damages resulting from the breach thereof.

64. Mr. Billingsley electronically signed an engagement letter with Mr. Teets on May 20, 2021, and paid Mr. Teets \$2,000.00 in fees on May 24, 2021, and \$2,760.00 in additional fees on May 27, 2021.

65. Mr. Teets filed suit on behalf of his client Mr. Billingsley in Williamson County Chancery Court, Case No. 94CH1-2021-CV-50473. They filed responsive motions including a motion to dismiss, which were set for hearing on August 19, 2021. Mr. Teets gave Mr. Billingsley the wrong court date for the hearing and told him not to appear.

66. Mr. Teets did not appear for the hearing on the motions whereupon the court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss, motion to vacate protective order, and motion to award injunctive bond to Defendants. The court entered orders on these motions on August 31, 2021. Despite knowing the court's ruling in the matter, Mr. Teets filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, and the court entered an order of nonsuit without prejudice on September 1, 2021.

67. Defendants filed a motion to set aside the order of nonsuit along with a motion for attorneys' fees on September 7, 2021. Despite Local Rule 5.03(c) of the Williamson County Trial Courts which requires party opposing a motion to file a response at least three business days prior to the hearing date, Mr. Teets did not respond to Defendants' motions.

68. Mr. Teets notified Mr. Billingsley by text message on September 21, 2021, that Mr. Billingsley did not need to appear in court on September 30th for the hearing on Defendants' motions, and assured Mr. Billingsley that he would appear in court on Mr. Billingsley's behalf for the hearing.

69. Mr. Teets did not appear in court for the hearing on September 30, 2021. The court granted the motion setting aside the order of nonsuit, and awarded Defendants their attorneys' fees in the amount of \$38,329.25.

70. Mr. Billingsley exchanged text messages with Mr. Teets on October 1, 2021, and again texted Mr. Teets on October 8th, asking if there was anything that he needed to be doing. Mr. Teets did not reply to the October 8th text.

71. Mr. Billingsley texted Mr. Teets once more on October 21, 2021, asking him the status of the suit in Williamson County Chancery Court. Mr. Teets responded that he was "starting to feel a bit like Job lately."

72. Mr. Teets attached a digital copy of the Tennessee Supreme Court's order suspending his license for one year entered on October 13, 2021, to his October 21st text message to Mr. Billingsley, but did not inform Mr. Billingsley of the court order awarding the Defendants' attorneys' fees against him.

73. On June 7, 2022, Mr. Billingsley filed a formal complaint against Mr. Teets with the Board. On June 9, 2022, the Board sent a copy of the complaint with a letter to Mr. Teets

requesting his response to the complaint.

74. Mr. Teets did not respond to the Board's letter of June 9, 2022.

Additional Facts Established at Hearing

75. Mr. Teets did not show up for the hearing on August 19, 2021, and told Mr. Billingsley the wrong date for the hearing. When the motions were unopposed at the hearing, the court granted motions to vacate the protective order and to dismiss the case.

76. Respondent lied to Mr. Billingsley about the outcome of the hearing on September 30, 2021, when he told Mr. Billingsley on October 1, 2021, that he was "on top of everything" (Exhibit 22, p. 27). Respondent admitted that everything had not gone in Mr. Billingsley's favor, but did not disclose the fact that attorneys' fees had been assessed against him or that the court had vacated the order of nonsuit. Respondent assured him he was filing a motion to be heard in 14 days.

77. Mr. Billingsley retained attorney Jesse Harbison to take over the case. She filed a motion to alter or amend the court's Orders of August 31, 2021 (Exhibit 21). The court held a hearing on October 29, 2021, and denied the motion by order dated April 29, 2022 (Exhibit 42).

78. Respondent was cooperative in providing Ms. Harbison at least some of his file pertaining to Mr. Billingsley's case, but she had to check the Williamson County Clerk's electronic filing system to obtain a complete file on the case.

79. Mr. Billingsley paid Mr. Teets over \$8,000.00 total for his representation in the case.

80. In addition to the fees he had paid to Respondent, Mr. Billingsley paid \$10,080.00 in attorney's fees to Ms. Harbison and reimbursed her for \$377.50 in legal expenses for her work on the case (Exhibit 24).

81. Mr. Billingsley entered a confidential settlement agreement with the Codys after the Court denied his motion to alter or amend the final judgment. Pursuant to the agreement, he paid the Defendants \$21,500.00 in settlement of the case on June 21, 2022 (Exhibit 25).

Facts Relevant to Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

82. During all times relevant to the allegations at issue in this matter, Respondent was suffering from mental health issues and a drug addiction (methamphetamine).

83. Respondent's violations were motivated by and committed as a result of his health issues, and in support of his drug addiction.

84. For the last several months, Mr. Teets has been participating in TLAP.⁴

85. Upon entering TLAP and completing an initial evaluation, Respondent complied with all treatment recommendations upon receiving his diagnosis, including a 60-day stay in a certified residential treatment program.

86. Respondent was diagnosed with a substance abuse disorder during his treatment with TLAP.

87. Mr. Teets is presently in a five-year monitoring contract with TLAP, which includes daily check-ins to see if the Respondent is selected for drug testing, and weekly attendance of at least four recovery meetings.

88. Respondent has been a model of compliance with the TLAP program and, according to the testimony of TLAP Executive Director Buddy Stockwell, no attorney has ever been more compliant with check-ins and meetings during the TLAP monitoring.

⁴ The Hearing Panel's findings of fact concerning Respondent's addiction and treatment are based largely on the testimony of Buddy Stockwell, the Executive Director of TLAP, and the affidavit of Dr. Corey Emerick, Respondent's therapist, which was admitted without objection at the hearing. The testimony of these witnesses is un rebutted, and the Hearing Panel credits their testimony.

89. Mr. Teets has been in a successful period of recovery for over one year.

90. Mr. Teets has actively participated in and led events in the recovery community, especially in the LGBTQ community.

91. Respondent is committed to sobriety and recovery and has expressed remorse for the harm that he has caused.

92. Mr. Stockwell believes that Respondent is fit to practice law, subject to his continuing monitoring agreement with TLAP.

93. Mr. Teets currently works at Walgreens and makes \$18.00 per hour. He has also intermittently worked as a paid staffer on political campaigns and as an Uber driver since his suspension from the practice of law.

94. Mr. Teets has been unable to make restitution to his clients since his suspension from the practice of law due to his decreased income.⁵

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. The Disciplinary System Generally

Pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 8, Tennessee attorneys are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Board of Professional Responsibility and its hearing panels, and the Circuit and Chancery Courts. The license to practice law in this state is a privilege, and it

⁵ The Board questioned the sincerity of Mr. Teets' desire to make restitution, arguing that he has shown "indifference in making restitution." The Board argues that Respondent testified to his job at Walgreens, and only later admitted to holding positions as a paid staffer for a mayoral campaign and an Uber driver. Board Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 18. The Hearing Panel disagrees with the Board's conclusion that it is not "credible that [Respondent] earns income from three (3) jobs, but never had enough money to begin paying restitution to even a single victim." *Id.* at 19. Two of Respondent's three jobs appear to be temporary or intermittent at best, and are unlikely to pay well enough and consistently enough for Respondent to make meaningful contributions to restitution. Even assuming *arguendo* that Mr. Teets may have been able to pay small amounts here and there, the overall record regarding his income and assets is insufficient to contradict Respondent's evidence of his desire to make restitution.

is the duty of every recipient of that privilege to conduct himself or herself at all times in conformity with the standards imposed upon members of the bar as conditions for the privilege to practice law. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 1. Acts or omissions by an attorney, individually or in concert with any other person, which violate the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State of Tennessee (“RPC”) constitute misconduct and grounds for discipline, whether or not the act or omission occurred in the course of an attorney-client relationship. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 11.

“In hearings on formal charges of misconduct, Disciplinary Counsel must prove the case by a preponderance of the evidence.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.2(h). If disciplinary violations are established, the Hearing Panel must consider the applicable provisions of the *ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* (“ABA Standards”) in imposing discipline. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a).

II. Specific Allegations in This Matter

A. Rules of Professional Conduct

The Board alleges that Mr. Teets violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

- *RPC 1.1: Competence*: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”
- *RPC 1.3: Diligence*: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”
- *RPC 1.4: Communication*

“(a) A lawyer shall:

- (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in RPC 1.0(e), is required

by these Rules;

- (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
- (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
- (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
- (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

- *RPC 1.5: Fees*

"(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:

- (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
- (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
- (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
- (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
- (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
- (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
- (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
- (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
- (9) prior advertisements or statements by the lawyer with respect to the fees the lawyer charges; and
- (10) whether the fee agreement is in writing."

- *RPC 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation:* "Except as stated in

paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.”

- *RPC 3.4: Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel*

“[A] lawyer shall not:

(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists

- *RPC 5.5: Unauthorized Practice of Law:* “A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction”

- *RPC 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services:* “A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.”

- *RPC 8.1: Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters:* “[A] lawyer in connection with . . . a disciplinary matter, shall not: (b) . . . knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by RPC 1.6.”

- *RPC 8.4: Misconduct:* It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to, *inter alia*, “(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; (d)

engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; [or] (g) knowingly fail to comply with a final court order entered in a proceeding in which the lawyer is a party, unless the lawyer is unable to comply with the order or is seeking in good faith to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law upon which the order is based.” RPC 8.4.

B. Analysis

Mr. Teets offered a limited defense at the hearing in this matter, focusing his testimony and arguments on mitigating factors. His proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law incorporate the facts to which the parties stipulated before the hearing, and provide additional facts focused solely on mitigation. Nonetheless, the Board must prove alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. *See* Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.2(h). Accordingly, the Hearing Panel will examine the facts relating to each complainant in order to determine whether the Board has established met its burden for each alleged violation.

1. *James Thayer*

The stipulated and established facts show that Mr. Teets violated RPC 1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client when he failed to perform the legal services for which he was hired. Respondent also violated RPC 1.5 by charging an unreasonable fee in light of his lack of performance, and RPC 8.1(b) by failing to respond to a lawful inquiry into his conduct from the Board.

2. *Ciciley Hoffman*

The record establishes that Respondent violated RPC 1.3 again by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Ms. Hoffman, leaving her unrepresented at a hearing on her charge of public intoxication. Mr. Teets also violated RPC 1.4 by failing to keep

the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter when he told her that he would be in court and then failed to appear, though this violation is very similar in nature to the RPC 1.3 violation. For substantially the same reasons as with Mr. Thayer, Respondent also violated RPC 1.5 by charging Ms. Hoffman an unreasonable fee in light of the nature of his services. Finally, Mr. Teets again violated RPC 8.1(b) by failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from the Board.

3. *Michael Herrin*

Although the evidence presented as to this complaint was minimal, the Board has met its burden in establishing that Respondent violated RPC 1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Mr. Elam. Mr. Teets also violated RPC 1.16(a)(1) by failing to withdraw from representation after his license to practice law was suspended, RPC 7.1(a) and 8.4(d) by misstating his Board registration number in court pleadings, and, again, RPC 8.1(b) by failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from the Board.

4. *Margaret Frances Sagi, Esq.*

The stipulated facts and testimony establish that Respondent violated RPC 1.16(a)(1) by failing to withdraw within 20 days after the effective date of his order of suspension and RPC 5.5(a) by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law while his license was suspended by seeking discovery on behalf of his client. The evidence also supports the alleged violation of RPC 7.1(a) and 8.4(c), (d), and (g), in that Respondent misrepresented to the prosecutors in the *Jensen* case that he could request and receive the State's discovery despite the fact that his practicing law would violate Rule 9, Sections 28.2 and 28.7, though this conduct is essentially the same that constitutes the violation of RPC 5.5(a). Respondent also, again, violated RPC 8.1(b) by failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from the Board.

5. *Christopher Tyrone Starnes*

In his representation of Mr. Starnes, Mr. Teets violated RPC 1.3 by failing to appear at a scheduled court hearing and otherwise represent his client. Respondent also violated RPC 1.4 by failing to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter and his efforts – or lack thereof – on the client's behalf. Respondent again violated RPC 1.5(a) by charging an unreasonable fee in light of his efforts, RPC 1.16(a)(1) by failing to withdraw from representation when his license was suspended, RPC 8.1 (b) by failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from the Board of Professional Responsibility, RPC 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and RPC 8.4(g) by violating Rule 9, Section 28, regarding the duties of suspended lawyers.

6. *Gregory Grant*

The fact that Mr. Teets was primarily a criminal lawyer alone does not establish that he was not competent to handle a civil appeal. That said, regardless of the precise reasons, the record is sufficient to establish that the representation that Mr. Teets provided to Mr. Grant did not constitute the competent representation required by RPC 1.1. In a similar manner as in the matters previously discussed, Mr. Teets again violated RPC 1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, RPC 1.4 by failing to keep him reasonably informed about the status of his case, RPC 1.5(a) by charging an unreasonable fee in light of the services performed, RPC 1.16(a)(1) by failing to withdraw from representation when his license was suspended, RPC 8.1(b) by failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from the Board of Professional Responsibility, RPC 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and RPC 8.4(g) by violating Rule 9, Section 28, regarding the duties of suspended lawyers.

7. *Caitlin Hayes*

The record supports the conclusion that Respondent violated RPC 1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Ms. Hayes, RPC 1.4 by failing to keep her reasonably informed about the status of the matter, RPC 1.5(a) by charging an unreasonable fee in light of the time and work performed, RPC 1.16(a)(1) by failing to withdraw from representation when his license was suspended, RPC 8.1 (b) by failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from the Board of Professional Responsibility, RPC 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and RPC 8.4(g) by violating Rule 9, Section 28, regarding the duties of suspended lawyers.

8. *John M. Schweri, Esq.*

In his dealings with Mr. Schweri, Mr. Teets violated RPC 1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, RPC 1.5 by collecting and retaining a fee for no work performed, RPC 1.16(d) by withdrawing without refunding any of the attorney's fee after agreeing to do so, and RPC 8.1(b) by failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from the Board of Professional Responsibility. Although Respondent's history of not refunding attorney's fees when appropriate is apparent, the Hearing panel finds that the Board did not meet its burden of proving that Respondent's statement that he would refund the fee Mr. Schweri paid constituted the type of intentional "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation" at the time that it was made that is required to establish a violation of RPC 8.4(c) above and beyond Respondent's violation of RPC 1.5.

9. *Matthew Billingsley*

As noted above with regard to Mr. Grant, the fact that Mr. Teets was primarily a criminal lawyer alone does not establish that he was not competent to handle a civil matter. That said,

regardless of the precise reasons, the record is sufficient to establish that the representation that Mr. Teets provided to Mr. Billingsley did not constitute the competent representation required by RPC 1.1. Mr. Teets' conduct also violated RPC 1.4 in that he failed to reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives could be accomplished, and RPC 1.5(a) in his charging an unreasonable fee in light of his services (or lack thereof). Furthermore, in reviewing the text messages exchanged between Respondent and Mr. Billingsley, the Hearing Panel finds that Respondent did violate RPC 8.4(c) in that he misrepresented the status of the case to his client by hiding or concealing the nature of the motions, the risks associated therewith, and the substance of the court's rulings until it was too late for Mr. Billingsley to avoid the consequences of Respondent's violations. This conduct also violated RPC 8.4(d), as it was prejudicial to the administration of justice and caused financial injury to Mr. Billingsley.⁶

In contrast, the Hearing Panel finds that the Board has not met its burden of proof in establishing a violation of RPC 1.16(d) in his representation of Mr. Billingsley. RPC 1.16(d) does not require a withdrawing attorney to provide successor counsel with "a complete file of the court filings in the case." See Board Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 17. Rather, it requires withdrawing counsel to provide, *inter alia*, cooperation with successor counsel and the prompt surrender of "papers and property to which the client is entitled and any work product prepared by the lawyer for the client and for which the lawyer has been compensated" and "any other work product prepared by the lawyer for the client. RPC 1.16(d). Ms. Harbison testified that

⁶ The Board alleges that Respondent also violated RPC 3.4(c) by failing to comply with the Local Rules of Williamson County Courts in filing no response to the opposing party's motions which were heard on September 30, 2021, when the Rules required a response to be filed. Section 5.03 of those rules requires a response to be filed "[i]f a motion is opposed." Although Respondent certainly should have opposed the motion for attorneys' fees, his actions are better characterized as a violation of the other rules addressed here than as a violation of RPC 3.4(c).

Mr. Teets was cooperative and provided her with materials in his possession relating to the case. The fact that those materials did not contain every filing in and of itself does not violate RPC 1.16(d), and the Board has not provided sufficient evidence to otherwise establish a violation of this particular Rule.

III. Application of the *ABA Standards*

A. ABA Factors To Be Considered in Imposing Sanctions

In summary, Respondent has committed multiple violations of RPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 5.5, 8.1, and 8.4, affecting multiple clients. Discipline is warranted. "The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely to properly discharge their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession." *ABA Standards* § 1.1. "In imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, a court should consider the following factors: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." *Id.* at § 3.0.

Although multiple ABA Factors could apply in this case, a few are most applicable to Respondent's conduct. Concerning Respondent's lack of diligence, absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances,

Disbarment is generally appropriate when: (a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or (b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or (c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.

Id. at § 4.41. In contrast, "Suspension is generally appropriate when: (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client, or (b) a lawyer

engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.” *Id.* at § 4.42.

Regarding his lack of competence, absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer’s course of conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures, and the lawyer’s conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client,” and “[s]uspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an area of practice in which the lawyer knows he or she is not competent, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.” *Id.* at §§ 4.51, 4.52. Discipline may also be warranted relating to Respondent’s possession of methamphetamine, as “[s]uspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.” *Id.* at 5.12.

Finally, in light of Mr. Teets’ prior discipline,

Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: (a) intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession; or (b) has been suspended for the same or similar misconduct, and intentionally or knowingly engages in further similar acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.

Id. at § 8.1. In contrast, “[s]uspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer has been reprimanded for the same or similar misconduct and engages in further similar acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.” *Id.* at § 8.2.

Respondent argues that suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case because “[s]uspension is generally appropriate when . . . a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes *injury or potential injury* to a client, or . . . engages in a pattern of neglect [that] causes *injury or potential injury* to a client.” *Maddux v. Board of Professional Responsibility*, 288

S.W.3d 340, 348-49 (Tenn. 2009) (emphasis added). The Board argues that the presumptive sanction in this case should be disbarment under Sections 4.41(a), (b), and (c), and that the question of disbarment versus suspension as the presumptive sanction largely turns on whether the ethical violations have caused *serious* or *potentially serious* injuries to clients. See *Hoover v. Board of Professional Responsibility*, 395 S.W.3d 95, 106-07 (Tenn. 2012).

The Hearing Panel agrees with the Board that Section 4.41 accurately describes Respondent's conduct and that disbarment is the appropriate presumptive sanction in this matter. The injuries to some of Respondents' client-victims are properly classified as serious. Mr. Billingsley paid over \$20,000.00 pursuant to a settlement agreement that was a direct result of Respondent's conduct, and paid over \$18,000.00 in total attorneys' fees for the privilege. Ms. Hoffman went without counsel at a criminal hearing which ended in her guilty plea (although the fine was small, any criminal matter is sufficient to qualify as serious). Mr. Grant's appeal was dismissed without any type of merits brief ever being filed. Although other consequences were not as harsh, the injuries endured by these clients are serious enough. The Hearing Panel finds that disbarment is the appropriate presumptive sanction pursuant to Section 4.41.⁷

B. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

"Aggravation or aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed." *Id.* at § 9.2. In contrast, "Mitigation or mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed." *Id.* at § 9.3. Based on the Findings of Fact set forth above, the

⁷ Although it is not material to the judgment given the Hearing Panel's conclusions regarding the applicability of Sections 4.41, the Hearing Panel notes that it would also find disbarment to be the appropriate presumptive sanction under Section 8.1(b) and suspension to be the correct presumptive sanction under Sections 4.52 and 5.12.

following aggravating circumstances are relevant in determining the appropriate sanction in this case.

- Prior disciplinary offenses
- Dishonest or selfish motive
- A pattern of misconduct
- Multiple offenses
- Illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances

These must be weighed against the following applicable mitigating circumstances.

- Personal or emotional problems
- Cooperative attitude toward disciplinary proceedings⁸
- Chemical dependency

Chemical dependency is an applicable mitigating circumstance when

(1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (3) the respondent's recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely.

Id. at § 9.32(i). The Findings of Fact support the first three elements necessary for mitigation due to chemical dependency. While the fourth factor is not beyond question, the unrebutted testimony of Mr. Stockwell and other supporting statements submitted by Mr. Teets are sufficient to warrant application of chemical dependency mitigation.

⁸ Although Mr. Teets originally failed to respond to inquiries by the Board, he has been cooperative in the proceedings before the hearing panel and stipulated to a significant number of facts alleged in the petitions for discipline. His conduct since the appointment of the Hearing Panel has been sufficiently cooperative to merit at least some consideration of this mitigating circumstance.

C. Application of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

This case – like any case involving a chemical dependency – presents a challenge in properly weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The record establishes that Mr. Teets was suffering from mental health and drug addiction issues during the period when he committed his violations. Drug addiction is a disease. *See, e.g.,* Indiana University Health, *Is addiction really a disease?* (July 13, 2023) (*last visited* August 10, 2023). Although there are multiple aggravating circumstances in this case, the record supports a conclusion that the primary cause of many of them was Mr. Teets' chemical dependency, a mitigating circumstance. The un rebutted testimony of TLAP's executive director establishes that Respondent is now in a period of successful recovery from that disease. He further concludes that Mr. Teets is fit to practice law. The Hearing Panel must determine whether disbarment is warranted under these circumstances.

At the conclusion of the disciplinary hearing in this matter, the Hearing Panel requested that the parties provide examples of analogous cases for its consideration. The Board cited to *Hoover and Sneed v. Board of Professional Responsibility*, 301 S.W.3d 603, 617-18 (Tenn. 2010), in arguing that disbarment is appropriate in cases like this one, with multiple violations and multiple client-victims, as opposed to single-victim cases. *Cf. Prewitt v. Board of Professional Responsibility*, 647 S.W.3d 357 (Tenn. 2022) (30-day suspension when attorney violated multiple RPCs in representation of her former boyfriend); *Mabry v. Board of Professional Responsibility*, 458 S.W.3d 900 (Tenn. 2014) (45-day suspension for failure of diligence with a single client); *Hanzelik v. Board of Professional Responsibility*, 380 S.W.3d 669 (Tenn. 2012) (45-day suspension for an attorney who improperly billed a client and failed to provide appropriate legal services to another client).

While this distinction may hold true as a general rule, neither of these cases addressed

mitigating circumstances involving a chemical dependency or a case where TLAP provided testimony regarding the attorney's recovery status and fitness. Indeed, the *Sneed* court specifically noted that "[t]he Panel found no mitigating factors, and no such factors have been suggested to this Court." *Sneed*, 301 S.W.3d at 617-18. Neither party provided the Hearing Panel with authority analogous to the particular circumstances presented here.

The Hearing Panel's own search confirms that analogous Tennessee case law is limited, but *Board of Professional Responsibility v. Love*, is instructive. In *Love*, a case involving reinstatement proceedings, the attorney's "excessive drinking compromised his ability to practice law competently." 256 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Tenn. 2008). Love had a history of disciplinary actions and a suspension for violations involving three clients. *Id.* at 646-47. In 1998, the Supreme Court suspended Love again, this time for three and one-half years, for his misappropriation of more than \$13,000.00 while serving as a conservator of his mother's affairs. *Id.* at 647.

In considering Love's petition for reinstatement, hearing panel found that, *inter alia*, Love had completed alcohol treatment with TLAP, made restitution of a total of \$200.00 to two clients, continued to participate in treatment at TLAP, and had been sober for more than three years. *Id.* at 648. The hearing panel recommended that Love be reinstated to the practice of law with conditions. *Id.* at 649. The trial court added additional conditions. *Id.* at 649-50. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected all but one of the trial court's added conditions in favor of the hearing panel's decision. *Id.* at 656.

Love addressed an attorney with few, but multiple client-victims. Some of the attorney's conduct, particularly misappropriation of more than \$13,000 from his mother's estate, was serious. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized the attorney's alcoholism as the primary cause of his conduct, choosing first to suspend Love despite prior discipline and then to affirm a hearing panel's

ruling that he be reinstated with conditions with only one change.

The Hearing Panel believes that the Supreme Court's general approach in *Love* is appropriate here. The record supports Respondent's contention that his violations were primarily a result of his mental health issues and chemical dependency. He has established that he has participated in the TLAP program with – so far – great success. He is presently in recovery and drug-free. TLAP's executive director testified that he is able to practice law. Given these facts, the chemical dependency mitigation factor weights strongly against disbarment. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel finds that, factoring in the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, a significant suspension with conditions for reinstatement is the proper discipline in this case.

JUDGMENT

Having considered the full record in these proceedings, the evidence presented by both parties at the disciplinary hearing, the post-hearing submissions of the parties, the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the *ABA Standards*, it is

ORDERED, that Respondent shall be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 48 months, 15 months of which shall be suspension in conjunction with a 33 month period of probation. In other words, after 15 months of suspension, Mr. Teets may practice under a probationary period for 33 months.

It is further **ORDERED**, that in order to practice on probation when eligible, Respondent must comply with the following conditions:

1. Respondent must continue his treatment and recovery with TLAP through the entire period of his suspension/probation and must be party to a monitoring agreement with TLAP during that time pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 14.1 and 36.1(d);

2. Respondent must practice in a group setting and under the supervision of a practice monitor for at least the first 12 months of his probationary period;
3. Respondent must reimburse the Board for the costs of these disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 9, Section 31.3(f) ("Payment of the costs and fees assessed pursuant to this Section shall be required as a condition precedent to any later request for reinstatement of the respondent or petitioning attorney."); and
4. Respondent must develop a plan to pay restitution in the total amount of \$55,157.50 during his probationary period, in amounts relating to each complaint as set forth in Exhibit A to this Judgment. The payment plan must be approved by the Board or a subsequent hearing panel of the Board.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Christopher C. Sabis
Panel Chair

/s/ Steven Parman (by C.C.S. with permission)
Panel Member


/s/ Luther Wright, Jr. (by C.C.S. with permission)
Panel Member

Exhibit A

James Thayer	\$1,500.00
Ciciley Hoffman	\$700.00
Michael Douglas Herrin, Esq.	\$3,000.00 (per the requirements of the court order)
Christopher Tyrone Starnes	\$2,000.00
Gregory Grant	\$4,500.00
Caitlin Hayes	\$2,000.00
John M. Schweri, Esq.	\$1,500.00
Matthew Billingsley	\$39,957.50
 Total	 \$55,157.50

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been sent to Kevin W. Teets, Jr, via email kteets@gmail.com, and James W. Milam, jmilam@tbpr.org, Disciplinary Counsel, on this the 25th day of August 2023.


Katherine Jennings
Executive Secretary

NOTICE

This judgment may be appealed by filing a Petition for Review in the appropriate Circuit or Chancery Court in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.