
Board of Professional Responsibility



Ethics Workshop










	ABOUT ARDC -	ARDC SERVICES -	CLERK'S OFFICE -	OTHER ORGANIZATIONS	RECENT FILINGS & DECISIONS
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Last Name: darrow Last Name Match: Exact		First Name Status: All	: clarence		

Registration status changes may not be reflected on Lawyer Search until the following business day. Address information is not available online for retired judges or lawyers who are retired, inactive, deceased or who never registered with ARDC, due to privacy considerations or because ARDC never received those addresses.

Name 🔻	Full Former Name(s)	City	State	Date Admitted	Authorized To Practice
Darrow, Clarence Allison				5/18/1971	Yes
Darrow, Clarence Michael				11/4/1999	Judge
Darrow, Clarence S.				9/18/1888	No







THE PEOPLE ex rel. Charles S. Deneen, State's Attorney, v.

CLEMENT J. BELINSKI.


Opinion filed December 16, 1903.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW—what is ground for disbarment. For an attorney to falsely represent to his client that he has filed a bill and procured a decree of divorce for him, giving him a copy of a fictitious decree, is cause for disbarment.

INFORMATION for disbarment.

WILLARD M. MCEWEN, DAVID S. GEER, JOHN T. RICH-ARDS, and FRANK B. PEASE, (FRED H. ATWOOD, and LOUIS B. DORR, of counsel,) for the relator.

DARROW & MASTERS, for the respondent.



James B. & and John J. McNamara


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
THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA

A BOOK FOR ALL & NONE


This is what Nietzsche himself in "Ecce Homo" says about "Zarathustra":

"This work stands alone. Do not let us mention the poets in the same breath: nothing perhaps has ever been produced out of such a superabundance of strength. My concept 'Dionysian' here became the highest deed; compared with it everything that other men have done seems poor and limited. The fact that a Goethe or a Shakespeare would not for an instant have known how to take breath in this atmosphere of passion and of the heights; the fact that by the side of Zarathustra, Dante is no more than a believer, and not one who first creates the truth-that is to say, not a world-ruling spirit, a Fate; the fact that the poets of the Veda were priests and not even fit to unfasten Zarathustra's sandal-all this is the least of things, and gives no idea of the distance, of the azure solitude, in which this work dwells. Zarathustra has an eternal right to say: 'I draw around me circles and holy boundaries. Ever fewer are they that mount with me to ever loftier heights. I build me a mountain range of ever holier mountains.' If all the spirit and goodness of every great soul were collected together, the whole could not create a single one of Zarathustra's discourses."


> WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY DR. OSCAR LEVY













Dear Sir:

Proceed immediately to the back platform of the train. Watch the east side of the track. Have your package ready. Look for the first <u>LARGE</u>, RED, BRICK factory situated immediately adjoining the tracks on the east. On top of this factory is a large, black watertower with the word CHAMPION written on it. Wait until you have COMPLETELY passed the south end of the factory - count five very rap idly and then IMMEDIATELY throw the package as far east as you can.

Remember that this is your only chance to recover your son.

Yours truly,


GEORGE JOHNSON





ROBERT FRANKS IS VICTIM OF MYSTERY DEATH

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Victim of Mystery Murder

THE CHICAGO DAILY JOURNAL

FUELDAY, MAY 20, 1929.

Moves to Pay Franks Letter Moves to Pay Franks Letter



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
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Killing Franks Boy, According to State's Attorney Growe of Chicago

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CANONS OF ETHICS.

6. ADVERSE INFLUENCES AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS

It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.

Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: ABA Current Clients

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:

(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or

(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: Current Clients - Comment



[23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.

Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: Current Clients - Comment



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decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.

Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 1.7

RULE 1.7-CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS

(A) EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH (B), A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT A CLIENT IF THE REPRESENTATION INVOLVES A CONCURRENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST. A CONCURRENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTS IF:

(1) THE REPRESENTATION OF ONE CLIENT WILL BE DIRECTLY ADVERSE TO ANOTHER CLIENT; OR

(2) THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT RISK THAT THE REPRESENTATION OF ONE OR MORE CLIENTS WILL BE MATERIALLY LIMITED BY THE LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES TO ANOTHER CLIENT, A FORMER CLIENT OR A THIRD PERSON OR BY A PERSONAL INTEREST OF THE LAWYER.

[23] PARAGRAPH (B)(3) PROHIBITS REPRESENTATION OF OPPOSING PARTIES IN THE SAME LITIGATION, REGARDLESS OF CONSENTABILITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, SIMULTANEOUS REPRESENTATION OF PARTIES WHOSE INTERESTS IN LITIGATION MAY CONFLICT, SUCH AS COPLAINTIFFS OR CODEFENDANTS, IS GOVERNED BY PARAGRAPH (A)(2). A CONFLICT MAY EXIST BY REASON OF SUBSTANTIAL DISCREPANCY IN THE PARTIES' TESTIMONY, INCOMPATIBILITY IN POSITIONS IN RELATION TO AN OPPOSING PARTY, OR THE FACT THAT THERE ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES OF SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIMS OR LIABILITIES IN QUESTION. SUCH CONFLICTS CAN ARISE IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES.

Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 1.7

(C) A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT MORE THAN ONE CLIENT IN THE SAME CRIMINAL CASE OR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, UNLESS:

(1) THE LAWYER DEMONSTRATES TO THE TRIBUNAL THAT GOOD CAUSE EXISTS TO BELIEVE THAT NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROHIBITED UNDER THIS RULE PRESENTLY EXISTS OR IS LIKELY TO EXIST; AND

(2) EACH AFFECTED CLIENT GIVES INFORMED CONSENT.

COMMON REPRESENTATION OF CO-DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL OR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS


[35] THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN REPRESENTING MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IS SO GRAVE THAT ORDINARILY A LAWYER SHOULD DECLINE TO REPRESENT MORE THAN ONE CO-DEFENDANT. HOWEVER, WHERE THE LAWYER CHOOSES TO UNDERTAKE SUCH A JOINT REPRESENTATION, PARAGRAPH (C) REQUIRES THAT THE LAWYER DEMONSTRATE TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE TRIBUNAL THAT GOOD CAUSE EXISTS TO BELIEVE THAT NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROHIBITED BY PARAGRAPH (B) PRESENTLY EXISTS OR IS LIKELY TO EXIST IN THE FUTURE. THIS SHOWING REFLECTS THE SAME STANDARD CURRENTLY REQUIRED BY TENNESSEE RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 44(C).

[36] HOWEVER, TO AVOID THE PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OF DEFENSE TACTICS, STRATEGY, OR OTHER INFORMATION RELATING TO THE REPRESENTATION, DEFENSE COUNSEL MAY REQUEST THAT THE TRIBUNAL HOLD AN EX PARTE HEARING TO DETERMINE THE PROPRIETY OF THE JOINT REPRESENTATION. SEE RPC 3.3(A)(3) (SETTING FORTH A LAWYER'S DUTY OF CANDOR IN AN EX PARTE HEARING); SEE ALSO RPC 3.5(B) (PERMITTING A LAWYER TO SPEAK EX PARTE TO A JUDGE WHEN PERMITTED TO DO SO BY LAW). ONCE THE TRIBUNAL IS SATISFIED THAT NO GOOD CAUSE EXISTS TO BELIEVE THAT A CONFLICT OF INTEREST CURRENTLY EXISTS OR IS LIKELY TO EXIST, A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION ARISES THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS THAT THE JOINT REPRESENTATION COMPORTS WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS RULE. HOWEVER, THIS PRESUMPTION IN NO WAY RELIEVES COUNSEL OF ANY DUTY IMPOSED UNDER THESE RULES SHOULD SUCH AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LATER ARISE.















"All the News That's Fit to Print."

VOL, LXXIII....No. 24,286.

SLAYERS OF FRANKS BOTH PLEAD GUILTY; JUDGE HOLDS FATE

Tense Audience Hears Darrow Throw Leopold and Loeb Socialist Ends Began to Aid

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Closing Argument The State of Illinois v. Nathan Leopold & Richard Loeb Delivered by Clarence Darrow Chicago, Illinois, August 22, 1924

Your Honor, it has been almost three months since the great responsibility of this case was assumed by my associates and myself. It has been three months of great anxiety. A burden which I gladly would have been spared excepting for my feelings of affection toward some of the members of one of these unfortunate families.

Our anxiety over this case has not been due to the facts that are connected with this most unfortunate affair, but to the almost unheard of publicity it has received; to the fact that newspapers all over this country have been giving it space such as they have almost never before given to any case. The fact that day after day the people of Chicago have been regaled with stories of all sorts about it, until almost every person has formed an opinion. And when the public is interested and demands a punishment, no matter what the offense, great or small, it thinks of only one punishment, and that is death. It may not be a question that involves the taking of human life; it may be a question of pure prejudice alone; but when the public speaks as one man, it thinks only of killing.

It was announced that there were millions of dollars to be spent on this case. Wild and extravagant stories were freely published as though they were facts. Here was to be an effort to save the lives of two boys by the use of money in fabulous amounts. We announced to the public that no excessive use of money would be made in this case, neither for lawyers nor for psychiatrists, or in any other way. We have faithfully kept that promise. The psychiatrists are receiving a per diem, and only a per diem, which is the same as is paid by the state. The attorneys, at their own request, have agreed to take such amount as the officers of the Chicago Bar Association may think proper in this case. If we fail in this defense it will not be for lack of money. It will be on account of money. Money has been the most serious handicap that we have met. There are times when poverty is fortunate.

I insist, Your Honor, that had this been the case of two boys of these defendants' age, unconnected with families of great wealth, there is not a state's attorney in Illinois who could not have consented at once to a plea of guilty and a punishment in the penitentiary for life. Not one. No lawyer could have justified any other attitude. No prosecution could have justified it.

We are here with the lives of two boys imperiled, with the public aroused. For what? Because, unfortunately, the parents have money. Nothing else.

I have heard in the last six weeks nothing but the cry for blood. I have heard from the office of the state's attorney only ugly hate. I have heard precedents quoted which would be a disgrace to a savage race. I have seen a court urged almost to the point of threats to hang two boys, in the face of science, in the face of philosophy, in the face of humanity, in the face of experience, in the face of all the better and more humane thought of the age.

Why, Mr. Savage [one of the prosecutors] says age makes no difference, and that if this court should do what every other court in Illinois has done since its foundation, and refuse to sentence these boys to death, none else would ever be hanged in Illinois.

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
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
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JUST PUBLISHED!!

Clarence Darrow

In Defence of

Leopold and Loeb A Verbatim Report Price 40 Cents

Darrow, who makes a business of defending the country's most notorious criminals merely for philanthropic reasons, admits getting \$65,000 for the defense of Loeb and Leopold, and says he "should have had four times that much." Philanthropy comes high these days.

The Tampa Tribune, January 11, 1928

ient 11 St. blue Soldiers Comp.



THE SCOPES TRIAL

Here, from July 10 to 21, 1925. John Thomas Scopes, a county high school teacher, was tried for teaching that man descended from a lower order of animals. in violation of a lately passed state law. William Jennings Bryan assisted the prosecution; Clarence Darrow, Arthur Carfield Hays and Dudley Field Malone the defense, Scopes was convicted.






SPENCER TRACY / FREDRIC MARCH / GENE KELLY

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with Dick York-Donna Anderson-Harry Morgan-Claude Akins Florence Eldridge Screeping to series a possible and entropy accel period from the dealer for the Block of Balance and Brandel by Maker sames Interior View of Cell House, new Illinois State Penitentiary at Stateville, near Jol



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CONVICT KILLS LOEB, FRANKS BOY SLAYER

Chicago Murderer Serving Life for 'Perfect Crime' Slashed With Razor in Brawl.

LONG JOLIET FEUD ENDED

Assailant Was Aide to Victim in Prison School—Crime in 1924 Shocked Nation.


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JOHN DALL - FARLEY GRANGER Sir Cedric Hardwicke - Constance Collier

JOAN CHANDLEB

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THE INFAMOUS LEOPOLD AND LOEB MURDER TRIAL



Stephen Dolginoff's THEREAL ME The Leopold & Loeb Story Off - Broadway Cast Recording







[36] HOWEVER, TO AVOID THE PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OF DEFENSE TACTICS, STRATEGY, OR OTHER INFORMATION RELATING TO THE REPRESENTATION, DEFENSE COUNSEL MAY REQUEST THAT THE TRIBUNAL HOLD AN EX PARTE HEARING TO DETERMINE THE PROPRIETY OF THE JOINT REPRESENTATION. SEE RPC 3.3(A)(3) (SETTING FORTH A LAWYER'S CANDOR IN AN EX PARTE HEARING); SEE ALSO DUTY OF RPC 3.5(B) (PERMITTING A LAWYER TO SPEAK EX PARTE TO A JUDGE WHEN PERMITTED TO DO SO BY LAW). ONCE THE TRIBUNAL IS SATISFIED THAT NO GOOD CAUSE EXISTS TO BELIEVE THAT A CONFLICT OF INTEREST CURRENTLY EXISTS OR IS LIKELY TO EXIST, A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION ARISES THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS THAT THE JOINT REPRESENTATION COMPORTS WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS RULE. HOWEVER, THIS PRESUMPTION IN NO WAY RELIEVES COUNSEL OF ANY DUTY IMPOSED UNDER THESE RULES SHOULD SUCH AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LATER ARISE.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE October 3, 2018 Session

IALYSIS CLINIC, INC. V. KEVIN MEDLEY ET AI


Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals Circuit Court for Davidson County No. 14C4843 Joseph P. Binkley, Jr., Judge


No. M2017-01352-SC-R11-CV

The attorney-client privilege "encourages full and frank communication between attorney and client by sheltering these communications from disclosure." State ex. rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass'n Self Ins. Group Trust, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 602, 615-16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3-105; Federal Ins. Co. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 816 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn. 1991)). The privilege is codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 23-3-105,² but whether it applies to a communication is "necessarily question, topic and case specific." Bryan v. State, 848 S.W.2d 72, 80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (citing Johnson v. Patterson, 81 Tenn. 626, 649 (1884)). For the privilege to apply, "[t]he communication must involve the subject matter of the representation and must be made with the intention that the communication will be kept confidential." Flowers, 209 S.W.3d at 616 (citing Bryan, 848 S.W.2d at 80). The privilege protects both the client's communications to the attorney and the attorney's communications to the client when the communications are based on the client's communications or when disclosure of the attorney's communications would reveal the substance of the client's communications. Boyd, 88 S.W.3d at 213 (citing Burke v. Tenn. Walking Horse Breeders' & Exhibitors' Ass'n, No. 01A01-9611-CH-00511, 1997 WL 277999, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 1997); Bryan, 848 S.W.2d at 80)).

The attorney-client privilege "encourages full and frank communication between attorney and client by sheltering these communications from disclosure." State ex. rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass'n Self Ins. Group Trust, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 602, 615-16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3-105; Federal Ins. Co. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 816 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn. 1991)). The privilege is codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 23-3-105,² but whether it applies to a communication is "necessarily question, topic and case specific." Bryan v. State, 848 S.W.2d 72, 80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (citing Johnson v. Patterson, 81 Tenn. 626, 649 (1884)). For the privilege to apply, "[t]he communication must involve the subject matter of the representation and must be made with the intention that the communication will be kept confidential." Flowers, 209 S.W.3d at 616 (citing Bryan, 848 S.W.2d at 80). The privilege protects both the client's communications to the attorney and the attorney's communications to the client when the communications are based on the client's communications or when disclosure of the attorney's communications would reveal the substance of the client's communications. Boyd, 88 S.W.3d at 213 (citing Burke v. Tenn. Walking Horse Breeders' & Exhibitors' Ass'n, No. 01A01-9611-CH-00511, 1997 WL 277999, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 1997); Bryan, 848 S.W.2d at 80)).

"No attorney, solicitor or counselor shall be permitted, in giving testimony against a client or person who consulted the attorney, solicitor or counselor professionally, to disclose any communication made to the attorney, solicitor or counselor as such by such person during the pendency of the suit, before or afterward, to the person's injury." Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3-105 (2009)





Wigmore's Definition of Privilege

- (1) [W]HERE LEGAL ADVICE OF ANY KIND IS SOUGHT;
 (2) FROM A PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ADVISER IN THE LAWYER'S CAPACITY AS SUCH;
 (0) THE GOLD HERE A PROFESSION ADVISED AND A PROF
- (3) THE COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THAT PURPOSE;
- (4) MADE IN CONFIDENCE;
- (5) BY THE CLIENT;
- (6) ARE AT THE CLIENT'S INSTANCE PERMANENTLY PROTECTED;
- (7) FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE CLIENT OR BY THE LEGAL ADVISER;
- (8) EXCEPT THE PROTECTION BE WAIVED.

Miscellaneous Privilege Notes

- Applies only to Communications, not Physical Evidence;
- It's the CLIENT's Privilege, not the Lawyer's;
- Absent Consent, a Lawyer must Always Assert the Privilege;
- Privilege is Either a Creature of the Common Law or Statute & Varies from State to State and from a State to the Federal System;
- Communications between Attorney & Client in the Presence of a Non-Agent 3rd Person Vitiates the Privilege;

More Privilege Notes

- If a Client, by Mistake or Otherwise, Discloses Info. the Privilege Can be Deemed Waived;
- A 'Fairness Doctrine' May Apply as to the Amount of Information that can be Revealed;
- When 2 or More Clients (*e.g.*, Partners in a Partnership) Engage the Same Attorney for a Matter, the Communicating Client, Knowing that the Attorney Represents the Other Party Also, Would not Ordinarily Intend that the Facts Communicated to the Lawyer Should be Kept Secret from the Other Client;

Still More Privilege Notes

- As a General Rule, the Name of a Client and the Fee Paid by a Client to a Lawyer is not Protected by Privilege;
- Privilege Survives Death;
- If You Talk to Your Mom, the Privilege Doesn't Apply Unless Your Mom is Your Lawyer.





<u>Home</u> <u>News</u> <u>Analysis</u> <u>Community</u> <u>CNN.com</u>

Investigating The President

Lewinsky's Mother Appears Before Grand Jury

Former intern's attorneys still trying to quash subpoena



Monica Lewinsky and her mother Marcia Lewis

WASHINGTON (AllPolitics, Feb. 10) -- Marcia Lewis, the subpoena for her failed.

After nearly three hours of testimony, Lewis appeared for (

"In anticipation of her appearance today, Marcia Lewis had testimony.

"Part of what she is feeling is a lot of pain for her daughter

Lewis and Martin made no further comment, but quickly v

Distinguishing Confidential Information & Privilege


























TENN. R. SUP. CT. 1.6

(A) A LAWYER SHALL NOT REVEAL INFORMATION RELATING TO THE REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT UNLESS:

(1) THE CLIENT GIVES INFORMED CONSENT;

(2) THE DISCLOSURE IS IMPLIEDLY AUTHORIZED IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE REPRESENTATION; OR

(3) THE DISCLOSURE IS PERMITTED BY PARAGRAPH (B) OR REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH (C).

(c) A LAWYER SHALL REVEAL INFORMATION RELATING TO THE REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT TO THE EXTENT THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELIEVES DISCLOSURE IS NECESSARY:

(1) TO PREVENT REASONABLY CERTAIN DEATH OR SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM;

(2) TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER OF A TRIBUNAL REQUIRING DISCLOSURE, BUT ONLY IF ORDERED TO DO SO BY THE TRIBUNAL AFTER THE LAWYER HAS ASSERTED ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENT ALL NON-FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS THAT THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY THE TRIBUNAL IS PROTECTED AGAINST DISCLOSURE BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE OR OTHER APPLICABLE LAW; OR

(3) TO COMPLY WITH RPC 3.3, 4.1, OR OTHER LAW.

[17A] PARAGRAPH (C)(1) RECOGNIZES THE OVERRIDING VALUE OF AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY AND REQUIRES DISCLOSURE LIFE REASONABLY NECESSARY TO PREVENT REASONABLY CERTAIN DEATH OR SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM. SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM INCLUDES LIFE-THREATENING AND DEBILITATING ILLNESSES AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE. SUCH HARM IS REASONABLY CERTAIN TO OCCUR IF SUCH INJURIES WILL BE IMMINENTLY OR IF THERE IS A PRESENT AND SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL THREAT THAT A PERSON WILL SUFFER SUCH INJURIES AT A LATER DATE IF THE LAWYER FAILS TO TAKE ACTION NECESSARY TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT. THUS, A LAWYER WHO KNOWS THAT A CLIENT HAS ACCIDENTALLY DISCHARGED TOXIC WASTE INTO A TOWN'S WATER SUPPLY MUST REVEAL THIS INFORMATION TO THE AUTHORITIES IF THERE IS A PRESENT AND SUBSTANTIAL RISK THAT A DRINKS THE WATER WILL CONTRACT A LIFE-PERSON WHO THREATENING OR DEBILITATING DISEASE AND THE LAWYER'S DISCLOSURE IS NECESSARY TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS.

17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976) 551 P.2d 334 131 Cal. Rptr. 14

Y TARASOFF et al., Plaintiffs and Appe v. THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et Respondents.

> Docket No. S.F. 23042. Supreme Court of California.

> > July 1, 1976.

Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information


(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;

M.R. 3140

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

ARTICLE VIII. ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF 2010





6th Amendment, Assistance of Counsel Clause

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

6th Amendment

The Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance attaches directly to the fidelity and competence of defense counsel's services, regardless of whether counsel is appointed or privately retained.

> Sixth Amendment Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions https://www.congress.gov/content/conan/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2017-10-7.pdf



PROVEN FEDERAL ATTORNEYS

PROTECTED CLIENTS IN 40+ STATES



Bill Tunkey

Former State Prosecutor Local Counsel Miami, Florida Phone: (305) 928-8505

Perhaps best known for his role in one of the most famous U.S. Supreme Court decisions of all time, Bill Tunkey is a recognized trial attorney who offers clients in Miami and throughout Southern Florida more than 30 years and hundreds of cases of experience.

Practice Focus. Bill's practice focus are white-collar defense and trial cases, in particular federal conspiracy charges. Throughout his career, Bill has handled scores of federal investigations and he has served as lead criminal defense counsel in a plethora of criminal prosecutions alleging healthcare fraud, mortgage fraud, bank fraud, tax fraud, securities fraud, as well as federal violent and computer crimes. Bill started his career as a prosecutor in Miami. Florida



PROVEN FEDERAL ATTORNEYS PROTECTED CLIENTS IN 40+ STATES

U.S. Supreme Court. To this day, no student will become a lawyer without knowing the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court unified conflicting state and federal approaches regarding a defendant's fair trial protection under the Sixth Amendment. Under the authorship of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court formulated a still valid standard to determine a trial lawyer's discretion to introduce mitigating circumstances and ruled that Mr. Tunkey, the lead defense counsel of Mr. Washington, satisfied the test and provided effective assistance of counsel to his client.

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

Syllabus

466 U. S.

668

STRICKLAND, SUPERINTENDENT, FLORIDA STATE PRISON, ET AL. V. WASHINGTON

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 82-1554. Argued January 10, 1984-Decided May 14, 1984

Respondent pleaded guilty in a Florida trial court to an indictment that included three capital murder charges. In the plea colloquy, respondent told the trial judge that, although he had committed a string of burglaries, he had no significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his criminal spree he was under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. The trial judge told respondent that he had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility." In preparing for the sentencing hearing, defense counsel spoke with respondent about his background, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. Counsel's decision not to present evidence concerning respondent's character and

STRICKLAND, SUPERINTENDENT, FLORIDA STATE PRISON, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON

- Washington pleaded guilty in Florida to three capital murder charges;
- In plea colloquy, he told trial judge that, although he committed a string of burglaries, he had no significant prior criminal record and that, at time of killing spree, he was under extreme stress caused by inability to support his family;
- Trial Judge says he has, "a great deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility."
- In preparing for sentencing, Tunkey spoke with Washington about client's background, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination;
- Strategically, Tunkey thought it best to rely on plea colloquy for evidence as to such matters, thus preventing State from cross-examining Washington and from presenting psychiatric evidence of its own.

STRICKLAND, SUPERINTENDENT, FLORIDA STATE PRISON, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON

- Tunkey did not request a presentence report, because it would have included his client's criminal history and would have undermined claim of no significant prior criminal record;
- Finding numerous aggravating circumstances and no mitigation, trial judge sentenced Washington to death on each murder count;
- Death sentence survived state court process;
- Washington filed federal habeas corpus action alleging ineffective assistance of counsel;
- District Court denied relief, but Court of Appeals found 6th Amendment violation and ordered remand;
- SCOTUS accepted review; &
- SCOTUS reverses the Court of Appeals in an 8-1 decision and establishes test for determining competence in a criminal context.

The Strickland Test

- 1. Was the lawyer's performance deficient, meaning was it so fundamentally defective so as to require a reversal of a conviction or a sentence?
- 2. Did the deficient performance prejudice the defendant, *i.e.*, is there a reasonable probability that the result would have been different?

The Strickland Test

The standards do not establish mechanical rules; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. A court need not first determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed.

-Justice Sandra Day O'Connor

668

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

Syllabus

466 U.S.

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable...A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy."...There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way...

decision not to present evidence concerning respondent's character and

Confessed Murderer of 3 Executed in Florida

By JESUS RANGEL Special to The New York These STARKE, Fig., July 13 = David L. Washington, 14 years old, a cerdeased triple murderer whose appeal for a reprieve was rejected Thursday night, ded this morning in the electric chair at the state prison here.

24

As more than 50 opponents and a handful of supporters of the death penalty held orderly vigils in a pasture across the street, a state executioner sent a 2,000 volt charge of electricity through Mr. Washington's body that son to be executed this week and the lasted one minute and 25 seconds. He was pronounced dead at 7:09 A.M. Another convicted murderer, Jimmy

Lee Smith, had been scheduled to be after the Supreme Court denied a reexecuted immediately after Mr. Wash- prieve, Ivon Ray Stanley, became the ington, in what would have been the nation's first double execution in 19 years. 1976.

But Thursday right the United States Supreme Court without commoni refused to lift a stay gramed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in Atlanta, for Mr. Smith, X), who was convicted for murdering a woman and her 12 year-cld child in 1978 in a wooded roadside in Marianna, Fla.

Mr. Washington was the second par-22d since the Supreme Court lifted its ben on the death penalty in 1978. In Georgia on Vedneslay, minutes

21st to die of the death penalty since

Witnesses to Mr. Washington's death said he appeared calm and had a halfsmile on his face as he was led from a cell to the 64-year-old oak electric chuir,

"It were amouthly and on schedule," said Vernos Bradford, spokesman for the Flordia Department of Corrections.

David Levine, a reporter for WCIX-TV in Miani, said Mr. Washington had expressed remorse for his actions. time that he was sorry for any grief and house.

that if his death makes them feel bettar, so be it," Nr. Levine said, "Re told all the guys in death row not to how their bends is defeat without a fight."

"He then and, 'I'm pervous,' and he jai. was executed," Mr. Levine recalled. The execution of Mr. Washington, one of 221 people on death row in Florida, came almost eight years after he killed three people in Miami in a 14-day roborry and abduction rampage.

He pleaded gality to the stabbing death and robbery of Daniel Pridgen, a Miami minister. He also admitted that he had abducted Frank Mell, 20, an accounting student, had tied him to a motel had for three days, and then had stabbed him II times.

The third nurder was of Katriea. Birk, 64, who was tied, gagged, "He said to the families of the vic- stabbed, shot and robbed in her Miami leased th Lices, sa

He had tirte lin 84¥. Nia la marts m sectory the biller tina.


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
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
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The ju later ow Court & musi ba delender Cal stat A Jus







Hardin County, Ky., on Feb. 12, 1809, this great man was born.

ImmigrationProf Blog

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Friday, March 4, 2016

Jose Padilla Lives! Crimmigration Events at DU Law School



Yolanda Vasquez (one of the attorneys who worked on the briefs in the Supreme Court in <u>Padilla v. Kentucky</u>) Meets Jose Padilla for the first time

Dan Kowalski blogged in detail about the appearance of Jose (or Joe) Padilla of *Padilla v. Kentucky* at a set of extremely crimmigration events organized by Professors Cesar Garcia Hernandez and Christopher Lasch at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law yesterday. Here is a link to Padilla's comments and a panel discussion of crimmigration papers by Professor Yolanda Vasquez and Linus Chan.

Mr. Padilla, a retired long haul trucker, was a wonderful participant in the events. The case that bears his name started off with his arrest on marijuana charges; in his presentation in Denver, Padilla said that he did not know the nature of the cargo he was transporting in his truck that led to his arrest in Kentucky.

I had always been curious about the facts of the Padilla's case. The facts as describe by Justice Stevens in his opinion for the Court in <u>Padilla v. Kentucky</u> did not offer much detail:

08-651 PADILLA V. KENTUCKY

DECISION BELOW: 253 S.W.3d 482



SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2006-SC-000321-DG

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Petitioner, who has lived in this country for nearly 40 years and served in the United States Army, is a legal permanent resident of this country, not a citizen. In 2001 Petitioner was indicted for trafficking in marijuana - an offense designated as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). Prior to entering a plea of guilty to that offense, Petitioner was incorrectly advised by his counsel that the plea would not affect his immigration status. Unfortunately, because the offense was an aggravated felony, Petitioner's deportation is mandatory. Upon discovery of this fact, Petitioner sought post conviction relief in Kentucky's state courts arguing that his attorney had improperly advised him. The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied post conviction relief holding the Petitioner was not entitled to accurate advice from his attorney on immigration consequences because he had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in that proceeding. Petitioner now seeks certiorari to review the following questions:

 Whether the mandatory deportation consequences that stem from a plea to trafficking in marijuana, an "aggravated felony" under the INA, is a "collateral consequence" of a criminal conviction which relieves counsel from any affirmative duty to investigate and advise; and

Assuming immigration consequences are "collateral", whether counsel's gross misadvice as to the collateral consequence of deportation can constitute a ground for setting aside a guilty plea which was induced by that faulty advice.

CERT. GRANTED 2/23/2009

(Slip Opinion)

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released and being done in connection with this case, at the sime The syllabus constitute

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which ROBERTS, C.J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

, aces deportation after pleading guilty to drugdistribution charges in Kentucky. In postconviction proceedings, he claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence before he entered the plea, but also told him not to worry about deportation since he had lived in this country so long. He alleges that he would have gone to trial had he not received this incorroot advice. The Kentucky Suprema Court denied Padilla nectoonvie.

McCoy v. Louisiana

5

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MCCOY v. LOUISIANA

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 16-8255. Argued January 17, 2018-Decided May 14, 2018

Petitioner Robert McCoy was charged with murdering his estranged wife's mother, stepfather, and son. McCoy pleaded not guilty to firstdegree murder, insisting that he was out of State at the time of the killings and that corrupt police killed the victims when a drug deal went wrong. Although he vociferously insisted on his innocence and adamantly objected to any admission of guilt, the trial court permitted his counsel, Larry English, to tell the jury, during the trial's guilt phase, McCoy "committed [the] three murders." English's strategy was to concede that McCoy committed the murders, but argue that McCoy's mental state prevented him from forming the specific intent necessary for a first-degree murder conviction. Over McCoy's repeated objection, English told the jury McCoy was the killer and that English "took [the] burden off of [the prosecutor]" on that issue. McCoy testified in his own defense, maintaining his innocence and pressing an alibi difficult to fathom. The jury found him guilty of all



To Try to Save Client's Life, a Lawyer Ignored His Wishes. Can He Do That?

Defense counsel has a duty to discuss potential strategies with a defendant, but Counsel's concession of guilt without the explicit consent of the defendantclient does not automatically constitute prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel.

-Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004)



10

Syllabus

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MCCOY v. LOUISIANA

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 16-8255. Argued January 17, 2018-Decided May 14, 2018.

- Petitioner Robert McCoy was charged with murdering his estranged wife's mother, stepfather, and son. McCoy pleaded not guilty to firstdegree murder, insisting that he was out of State at the time of the killings and that corrupt police killed the victims when a drug deal went wrong. Although he vociferously insisted on his innocence and adamantly objected to any admission of guilt, the trial court permitted his counsel, Larry English, to tell the jury, during the trial's guilt phase, McCoy "committed [the] three murders." English's strategy was to concede that McCoy committed the murders, but argue that McCoy's mental state prevented him from forming the specific intent. necessary for a first-degree murder conviction. Over McCoy's repeated objection. English told the jury McCoy was the killer and that English "took [the] burden off of [the prosecutor]" on that issue. McCoy testified in his own defense, maintaining his innocence and pressing an alibi difficult to fathom. The jury found him guilty of all three first-degree murder counts. At the penalty phase, English again conceded McCoy's guilt, but urged mercy in view of McCoy's mental and emotional issues. The jury returned three death verdicts. Represented by new counsel, McCoy unsuccessfully sought a new The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's trial. ruling that English had authority to concede guilt, despite McCoy's opposition.
- Held: The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the objective of his defense and to insist that his counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel's experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Pp. 5–13.
 - (a) The Sixth Amendment guarantees to each criminal defendant "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The defendant does not

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Syllabus

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus MCCOY v. LOUISIANA

Because a client's autonomy, not counsel's competence, is in issue, we do not apply our ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel jurisprudence, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), or United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648 (1984), to McCoy's claim. See Brief for Petitioner 43–48; Brief for Respondent 46–52. To gain redress for attorney error, a defendant ordinarily must show prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S., at 692. Here, however, the violation of McCoy's protected autonomy right was complete when the court allowed counsel to usurp control of an issue within McCoy's sole prerogative.

Non-Delegable Client Decisions

- 1. Whether to Plead Guilty;
- 2. Whether to Waive the Right to a Jury Trial;
- 3. Whether to Testify on One's Own Behalf; &
- 4. Whether to Forgo an Appeal.

Justice ALITO, with whom Justice THOMAS and Justice GORSUCH join, dissenting.

... The Court holds that English violated petitioner's constitutional rights by "admit[ting] h[is] client's guilt of a charged crime over the client's intransigent objection."...But English did not admit that petitioner was guilty of first-degree murder. Instead, faced with overwhelming evidence that petitioner shot and killed the three victims, English admitted that petitioner committed one element of that offense, *i.e.*, that he killed the victims. But English strenuously argued that petitioner was not guilty of first-degree murder because he lacked the intent (the *mens rea*) required for the offense. ")...

McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1512 (2018)

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Justice ALITO, with whom Justice THOMAS and Justice GORSUCH join, dissenting.


...[M]ost of the decisions that arise in criminal cases are the prerogative of counsel. (Our adversarial system would break down if defense counsel were required to obtain the client's approval for every important move made during the course of the case.) Among the decisions that counsel is free to make unilaterally are the following: choosing the basic line of defense, moving to suppress evidence, delivering an opening statement and deciding what to say in the opening, objecting to the admission of evidence, cross-examining witnesses, offering evidence and calling defense witnesses, and deciding what to say in summation...

McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1516 (2018)

Rule 1.2: Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & Lawyer



(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.



STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL REGULATION

REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

REVISED RESOLUTION

RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association amends ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16 and its Comments [1], [2], and [7] as follows (insertions underlined, deletions struck through):

Rule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation

(a) <u>A lawyer shall inquire into and assess the facts and circumstances of each representation to determine whether the lawyer may accept or continue the representation.</u> Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:

(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or

(3) the lawyer is discharged; or

(4) the client or prospective client seeks to use or persists in using the lawyer's services to commit or further a crime or fraud, despite the lawyer's discussion pursuant to Rules 1.2(d) and 1.4(a)(5) regarding the limitations on the lawyer assisting with the proposed conduct.

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STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL REGULATION

REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

REVISED RESOLUTION

The Proposed Amendments to Model Rule 1.16 and its Comments

After careful consideration over several years of concerns raised by ABA members and outside groups that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct lacked sufficient clarity on lawyers' client due diligence obligations <u>to inquire about and assess the facts</u> <u>and circumstances relating to a matter</u>, the Committees concluded that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16 should be amended to make explicit that which is already implicit.

(4) the client or prospective client seeks to use or persists in using the lawyer's services to commit or further a crime or fraud, despite the lawyer's discussion pursuant to Rules 1.2(d) and 1.4(a)(5) regarding the limitations on the lawyer assisting with the proposed conduct.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Formal Opinion 513

August 23, 2024

Duty to Inquire Into and Assess the Facts and Circumstances of Each Representation

As recently revised, Model Rule 1.16(a) provides that: "A lawyer shall inquire into and assess the facts and circumstances of each representation to determine whether the lawyer may accept or continue the representation." To reduce the risk of counseling or assisting a crime or fraud, some level of inquiry and assessment is required before undertaking each representation. Further inquiry and assessment is required when the lawyer becomes aware of a change in the facts and circumstances relating to the representation that raises questions about whether the client is using the lawyer's services to commit or further a crime or fraud.

The lawyer's inquiry and assessment will be informed by the nature and extent of the risk that the current or prospective client seeks to use, or persists in using, the lawyer's services to commit or further a crime or fraud. If after having conducted a reasonable, risk-based inquiry, the lawyer determines that the representation is unlikely to involve assisting in a crime or fraud, the lawyer may undertake or continue the representation. If the lawyer has "actual knowledge" that the lawyer's services will be used to commit or further criminal or fraudulent activity, the lawyer must decline or withdraw from the representation.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Formal Opinion 513

August 23, 2024

Duty to Inquire Into and Assess the Facts and Circumstances of Each Representation

Hypothetical 1: An investor based outside the United States contacts an established real estate lawyer seeking representation regarding the proposed purchase of an office building in the lawyer's city. The lawyer has not represented the investor previously but was referred to the lawyer by a well-known real estate lawyer in another part of the same state who, before retiring, had represented the investor in several similar purchases.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

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Hypothetical 1: An investor based outside the United States contacts an established real estate lawyer seeking representation regarding the proposed purchase of an office building in the lawyer's city. The lawyer has not represented the investor previously but was referred to the lawyer by a well-known real estate lawyer in another part of the same state who, before retiring, had represented the investor in several similar purchases.

Hypothetical 2: Less than one month after the lawyer undertakes the representation described in Hypothetical 1, the client contacts the lawyer to say that another, similar building is for sale in the same city. That building is available at an attractive price, but only if the transaction closes quickly. To expedite the closing, the client would like to purchase the building using funds transferred from an account at a bank in the client's country of residence.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

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Duty to Inquire Into and Assess the Facts and Circumstances of Each Representation

Different facts might warrant a different conclusion, however. For example, additional inquiry would be required if the client intended to transmit the funds to an account controlled by the lawyer, who would then transmit them to the seller. A higher risk of participating in money laundering or terrorist financing exists when the lawyer "touches the money," i.e., acts as a financial intermediary handling the receipt and transmission of funds through accounts controlled by the lawyer. In such circumstances, the lawyer should seek additional information regarding the source of funds.

Board of Professional Responsibility



Ethics Workshop